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A Madisonian Interpretation of the
Equal Protection Doctrine
Political philosophers and constitutional theorists have long been troub-
led by the problem of how to protect minority rights in a democracy with-
out at the same time undermining majority rule.' James Madison at-
tempted to resolve this problem by creating a republican political process
that would protect minority rights.2 Central to that process was Madison's
belief that minorities would receive better treatment from a large federal
republic than from the individual states.3
This Note begins by defending Madison's insight that minorities are
best protected by the federal government. It then explores the implications
of that insight for modern equal protection analysis and for John Hart
Ely's theory of judicial review. The Note attempts to show not only that
the federal legislative process should in theory protect minorities, but that
the process has in fact worked as Madison predicted it would. Conse-
quently, the Note contends that judicial application of equal protection
doctrines against the federal government should concern itself primarily
1. The need to protect minorities from the democratic process without undermining majority rule
has been a constant concern of political philosophy. See infra note 5. James Madison sought to ad-
dress that concern by arguing that the political pluralism of a large republic would itself safeguard
minority rights. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison) (Mentor Book ed. 1961). Others have argued
that judicial review is needed to secure the individual rights guaranteed in the Constitution. Id. No.
78, at 466 (A. Hamilton) (Mentor Book ed. 1961); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amend-
ment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 3 (1971) (suggesting that a purpose of constitutional theory is delinea-
tion of respective spheres of majority and minority freedom).
Recently, one scholar has even suggested that a principal function of courts should be the protection
of certain minorities from the democratic process. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 135-79 (1980).
Ely develops his argument from footnote four of United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152-
53 n.4 (1938). That footnote suggests that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a
special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily
to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching
judicial inquiry." Id. at 153.
2. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 10, at 77-84; id. No. 51, at 320-25 (J. Madison) See
also J. ELY, supra note 1, at 79-87 (commenting on implications of Madisonian theory for protection
of minorities).
3. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, Nos. 10 & 51 (J. Madison). See also THE MIND OF THE
FOUNDER xxvii (M. Meyers ed. 1981) (referring to Madison's argument that large democracy would
treat minorities better than states would as lying at "the heart of Madison's Great Republic").
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with invoking congressional review through vigorous use of the non-dele-
gation doctrine.
The Note goes on to criticize the expansion of equal protection analysis
beyond the core area of discrimination against minorities by the states. It
argues that this expansion has weakened the absolute equal protection
guarantees that are needed at the state level and has contributed to the
exaggerated importance currently being placed on equality as a national
norm.
As a matter of constitutional law, the Note argues that it is appropriate
to differentiate between the states and the federal government in equal
protection analysis. This holds true whether one looks to the text, to the
intent of the Framers, or to arguments of structure and relation. In addi-
tion, recent Supreme Court decisions provide some evidence that a less
stringent equal protection standard is in fact being applied at the federal
level. The Note shows that, at the very least, a basis exists in the case law
on which a Madisonian equal protection doctrine could be built.
I. Madison's Argument that the Federal Government Will Treat Mi-
norities Better than Will the States
A distinguishing feature of American democracy is that the federal gov-
ernment has generally been more protective of minority rights than have
the states.4 James Madison first predicted and explained this phenome-
non, even before the Constitution was adopted.' Madison argued that fed-
4. This has been true historically and is just as true today. During the colonial period, for exam-
ple, a major impetus for ratification of the Constitution came from the desire of a mercantile minority
to protect itself from various attempts at debtor's relief in the state legislatures. F. MCDONALD, E
PLURIBUS UNUM 199-207 (1965). Thus Madison argued that "[a] rage for paper money, for an
abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will
be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it .... " THE
FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 10, at 84.
After the colonial period, the federal government continued to be more protective of minority rights
than were the states. This was particularly evident in the disputes over slavery that culminated in the
Civil War. See P. LEWINSON, RACE, CLASS, AND PARTY 80-87 (1932) (noting state constitutional
barriers directed against blacks); Scruggs, The Economic and Racial Components of Jim Crow, in
KEY ISSUES IN THE AFRO-AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 70-87 (N. Huggins, M. Kilson, & D. Fox eds.
1971) (describing Jim Crow laws).
More recently, the record built by legislators in their successful effort to extend the Voting Rights
Act powerfully supports the view that many states remain less trustworthy than the federal govern-
ment, particularly in the area of election law. See H.R. REP. No. 227, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
For these reasons, national organizations of black and hispanic voters sought and obtained a twenty-
five year extension of the Voting Rights Act. 40 CONG. Q. 1503-04 (1982). They believed that contin-
ued federal supervision of state and local election procedures was essential to secure minority rights.
5. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 10, at 77-84; id. No. 51, supra note 2, at 320-25. Madison
was also the first political philosopher to argue that a large democracy would protect minorities better
than a small one. THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER, supra note 3, at xxvii-xxviii. Prior to Madison,
political philosophers had always argued that democracy could exist only in a small state where there
was the possibility of direct popular rule. Such states, it was thought, had to be fairly homogeneous
and egalitarian in order to avoid severe factionalism. R. DAHL & E. TUFTE, SIZE AND DEMOCRACY 5-
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eralism would help solve one of the central problems of democracy: the
propensity of popular governments to resolve conflicts "not according to
the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior
force of an interested and overbearing majority."6
Madison thought that "[t]he latent causes of faction. . . [were] sown in
the nature of man,'"7 but were aggravated by systems of government that
allowed monolithic and entrenched majorities to rule.' In his view, the
states were more likely to produce such entrenched majorities than was
the newly proposed federal government.' In particular, Madison identified
two structural features of the federal government that he believed would
hinder the creation of self-sufficient and potentially tyrannous majorities.
A. Variety of Interests
First, Madison argued that the great variety of interests in a large re-
public would make it harder for a permanent majority coalition to form at
the national level.10 The many factions in such a coalition would have
8, 11 (1973) (Madison's argument marked "historical watershed"); see ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 293 (E.
Baker trans. 1952); MONTESQUIEU, 1 DE L'ESPRIT DES LOIS bk.8, at 131 (1961); PLATO, 2 LAWS, IN
THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 738, 742, 771 (E. Jowett trans. 1937); J. ROUSSEAU, DU CONTRAT SOCIAL
I, 5; II, 9-10; III, 1, 3, 4, 13 (1962). It was conceded that, because of their size, such pure democracies
would generally be vulnerable to invasion and inefficacious in solving major political problems.
Madison, by arguing that a large republic would best protect minorities, rejected requirements of
homogeneity, egalitarianism, and smallness. His argument laid the basis for modem representative
democracy and refuted the assumptions of Plato, Aristotle, Montesquieu, Rousseau, and of the Anti-
federalists. R. DAHL & E. TUFTE, supra, at 8-13. See also THE ANTIFEDERALISTS xxxix-xlviii (C.
Kenyon ed. 1966) (Antifederalists argued that large democracy would not work); Adair "That Politics
May be Reduced to a Science" David Hume, James Madison, and the Tenth Federalist, 20 HUNT-
INGTON LIBR. Q. 343 (1957) (Madison's Tenth Federalist may reflect Hume's influence).
6. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 10, at 77. This problem had characterized the colonial
legislatures, see generally F. MCDONALD, supra note 4, and the democracies of the Greek City States,
J. BURY & R. MEIGGS, A HISTORY OF GREECE (4th ed. 1975). Such turbulence had been considered
characteristic of democracies prior to the formation of the American Republic. R. DAHL & E. TUFTE,
supra note 5,at 11.
7. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 10, at 79. Madison argued that factionalism resulted from
the fallibility of men and the diversity in their "faculties . . . , from which the rights of property
originate." Id. at 78. Thus "the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and
unequal distribution of property." Id. at 79.
8. Id. at 81.
9. Id. at 81-84.
10. In Madison's words,
the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the com-
pass of republican than of democratic government. . . renders factious combinations less to be
dreaded in the former than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be
the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the
more frequently will a majority be found of the same party. . .. Extend the sphere and you
take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of
the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens ....
Id. at 83. Madison elaborated on this idea in the Fifty-first Federalist where he observed that
in the federal republic of the United States. . . all authority . . . will be derived from and
dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests and
classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from
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different interests that would be likely to conflict over time.1" As Madison
predicted, national leaders have, in fact, had trouble designing the com-
promises necessary to hold such coalitions together.2 Ultimately, the diffi-
culty of maintaining a permanent majority coalition in Congress has
proven similar to that of maintaining a large, multimember cartel.
Like such cartels, majority coalitions in Congress typically contain more
members than their leaders can simultaneously satisfy. Thus, some of
those members are inevitably led by their own self-interest to seek new
and more promising allies." As a result, national coalitions are unlikely to
interested combinations of the majority . . .. [Thus] [i]n the extended republic of the United
States, and among the great variety of interests, parties and sects which it embraces, a coalition
of the majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those
of justice and the general good ....
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 2, at 324-25.
11. These conflicting interests help to protect minority rights by making it difficult to maintain
permanent majority coalitions. Although recently some parts of the Madisonian system have come
under attack, the protection that system provides for minority interests is generally acknowledged. See
e.g., N. ORNSTEIN & S. ELDER, INTEREST GROUPS, LOBBYING, AND POLICYMAKING 223-30 (1978).
Several scholars have agreed with Madison, for example, that group politics, together with overlap-
ping group memberships, does limit the threat posed by factionalism. See D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERN-
MENTAL PROCESS (1951); See also A. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT (1908) (describing
American politics in group terms). Compare E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE 1-
46 (1960)(suggesting that Madisonian interest group politics protects mainly those business minorities
that can afford the high cost of lobbying) with N. ORNSTEIN & S. ELDER, supra at 228 (noting the
recent marked growth and influence of public interest lobbies such as Common Cause).
Some scholars have acknowledged that interest group politics protects minorities, but have chal-
lenged the assumption that that protection is desirable. T. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 287-91
(1969); Will, The Madison Legacy, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 7, 1981, at 124. Others have asserted that the
minorities best protected by the Madisonian political process are those with few members and specific
material interests; broad public interest groups have a harder time succeeding. M. OLSON, THE LOGIC
OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 53-65 (1965); Salisbury, An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups, MIDWEST
J. POL. SI., Feb., 1969, at 1-32.
12. The difficulty experienced even by the relatively popular Reagan Administration in maintain-
ing its coalition of moderate Republicans, economic conservatives, and social conservatives furnishes
one example. See A Coalition in Shambles, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 22, 1982, at 25; The GOP's Family
Feud, NEWSWEEK, March 15, 1982, at 24; The Right Vs. Jim Baker, NEWSWEEK, May 31, 1982, at
31.
The difficulty of maintaining majority coalitions in Congress is readily observable. As one scholar
has noted:
The fact that the American Congress has to be managed by an extraordinary amount of pull-
ing and hauling, maneuvering and compromising, rather than by the quiet and orderly regis-
tration of party majorities, gives rise to criticism, to proposals for party reform, and to no little
bewilderment among our allies around the world. . .. The members of the majority unite to
control the machinery of Congress, but on substantive matters they often break ranks. So im-
perfect is the mobilization of party strength that some commentators dismiss party as irrelevant
to the business of legislation.
V. KEY, POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS 677-78 (5th ed. 1964).
13. Self-interest always leads some members in a large cartel to break away because each member
tends to have a different marginal cost curve. As a result it is harder for all to agree on what price to
set. As cartels become larger, the costs of monitoring members' prices also increase. This makes it
hard to preserve cartel discipline. For a discussion of the difficulty of maintaining cartels, see R.
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 292-93 (1978); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 51-53 (1976).
Analogies from the free market theory of cartels to Madisonian political theory are particularly
appropriate because both theories involve an attempt to regulate human behavior by setting self-
interest against self-interest. Prior to the Enlightenment such attention to self-interest was rare. Phi-
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harden into entrenched majority and minority blocks. Self-interest and the
variety of factions in a large republic prevent any one group from mono-
polizing the political marketplace.
At the state level, however, the smaller number of factions facilitates the
forming of entrenched majority coalitions. Just as cartels form most easily
in homogenous markets with few producers, entrenched majority coali-
tions form most easily in homogenous legislatures with few factions.' " The
more competitive or fluid the environment, the more difficult cartelization
becomes. Competitive environments with large numbers of dissimilar fac-
tions quickly wear down any entrenched majorities.'"
Because majority coalitions in Congress have been less stable than ma-
jority coalitions in the state legislatures, special interest groups have had
more influence at the national level. Congressional leaders often need mi-
nority votes and therefore have an incentive to treat minority representa-
tives and issues favorably. Accordingly, the national political processes are
unlikely to be curtailed by any special conditions of prejudice. Indeed, by
forcing congressional leaders to bid for their support, minority groups in
Congress have obtained the political leverage of single-issue voters: they
have extracted concessions that could never be obtained at the state level.16
losophy had originally sought to improve man's condition through education and through appeals to
"noble" instincts. See generally R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975).
14. Antitrust scholars have long stressed the relevance of product homogeneity, as well as the
number of producers, to determinations of whether a market is likely to be competitive. Cartels are
most easily formed in markets where each manufacturer's product is similar. R. POSNER, supra note
13, at 59-60.
The same situation prevails in politics. Although the number of factions in a legislature is signifi-
cant, the degree to which those factions differ from each other is significant as well. Thus even if a
state legislature had as many factions as did Congress, it would still be easier to form a coalition at the
state level than it would be at the national level. No state will have the variety of interest groups that
can be found at the national level.
15. The analogy between economic and political monopolies has broad implications for our under-
standing of the problem of entrenched political majorities. Economists have long recognized that even
the most successful monopolies can exist only for limited periods of time. Barriers to entry tend to
break down unless monopolies are reinforced by state power. Thus the economic inefficiencies of
monopolization are a short-run phenomenon. See R. POSNER, supra note 13, at 57-59; J.
SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 98-100 (3d ed. 1950).
Similarly, entrenched majorities at the state level exist only in the short run. Over time, the move-
ment of people or money between states can force local majorities to change policy. But see infra note
26. In the short run, however, an entrenched majority will often prevail.
Society attempts to deal with temporary economic monopolies through the mechanism of antitrust
laws. Under a consumer welfare model, such laws work only to accelerate the natural erosion of
temporary monopolies. R. BORK, supra note 13, at 311. Similarly, Madisonian politics accelerates the
natural erosion of entrenched political majorities. It creates the sort of fluid, competitive environment
in which entrenchment is difficult.
16. Minority interests of all kinds have benefitted from the advantages created by the structure of
the federal government. The Congressional Black Caucus benefitted when that group sought to extend
the Voting Rights Act; middle class farmers have also benefitted when their tobacco price supports
were preserved. Groups that might be shunned at the state level have found themselves wooed in
Congress. There is less likelihood of a refusal to deal at the national level by a self-sufficient majority
because self-sufficient majorities are themselves less likely to form. See infra note 24 (discussing some
disadvantages of interest group politics).
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The instability of congressional coalitions has thus benefitted minorities by
making prejudice more costly and less likely at the federal level.1 7
B. Organizational Costs
A second feature of the national government that operates to protect
minority rights involves the sheer numbers of people who must be brought
together in a large democracy to form a popular coalition. According to
Madison, these numbers should create a communication problem by mak-
ing it hard for would-be oppressors "to discover their own strength and to
act in unison . . .,Is
As Madison foresaw, communication and organizational costs are com-
paratively lower for discrete and insular minorities than for large, amor-
phous groups: their very cohesiveness enables minorities to organize more
effectively than can the "silent majority."19 As the size of a polity expands,
this organizational disparity steadily increases. Thus the organizational
advantage that minorities possess, even at the state level, becomes more
pronounced in the federal government.2"
Modern communications technology has perhaps made it easier than it
was in Madison's time for a majority faction to overcome organizational
costs at the federal level. 21 Those same advances, however, have benefitted
minorities at least as much. 22 Minorities are now able to concentrate their
limited resources in one or two media centers where they can obtain more
attention and influence than they could have if those resources were dis-
persed throughout the fifty states. This ability to fight one visible battle,
rather than fifty unnoticed skirmishes, strengthens the political power of
minorities in our federal system.
17. Such prejudice is of special concern because it may block the normal political protections for
minorities. See United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938); J. ELY, supra note
1.
18. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 10, at 83. Madison also noted that "where there is a
consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes communication is always checked by distrust in pro-
portion to the number whose concurrence is necessary." Id. at 83.
19. Indeed, the "silent majority" is silent precisely because it often cannot afford the high costs of
organizing and communicating. For a detailed explanation of how discreteness and insularity benefit
minorities politically by lowering organization costs, see M. OLSON, supra note 11, at 165.
The idea of applying Olson's work on organizational costs to constitutional law was introduced and
developed in a series of lectures given by Professor Bruce Ackerman at the Yale Law School during
the years 1978-82. It will be discussed extensively in a forthcoming book by Professor Ackerman
tentatively entitled "Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law."
20. M. OLSON, supra note 11, at 165.
21. See D. BRODER, THE CHANGING OF THE GUARD 386-402 (1981). Broder notes that "[i]f
there is one institution that has changed American politics since World War II . . . it is television."
Id. at 386. As the nationally broadcast McCarthy and Watergate hearings demonstrated, television
can galvanize a national majority in a way that was impossible in Madison's time.
22. Recently political action groups have been very successful in using modern technology to affect
elections. The National Conservative Political Action Committee in particular has been successful, in
part through the use of mass mailing lists. It in turn has spawned various liberal imitators.
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Madison's variety of interests argument and his organizational costs ar-
gument are, of course, interdependent. 23 For example, low organizational
costs for minorities in Congres would be useless if that body were domi-
nated by a stable majority coalition. State legislatures may be so domi-
nated and may leave little room for minorities to exploit their organiza-
tional advantage. Similarly, the instability of congressional coalitions
would not help minorities much if they could not afford to organize easily.
Thus, large amorphous groups, whose organizing costs are high, have
been relatively unsuccessful in Congress. Taxpayers24 and women can tes-
tify to this phenomenon.
The political influence and organizational strength of minorities at the
federal level together should result in better protection for minority inter-
ests in Congress than in the state legislatures. 25 Indeed, the very discrete-
23. It should be noted as well that Madison offered several arguments for his position in addition
to the arguments pertaining to variety of interests and organizational costs. For example, he antici-
pated that because Congressmen represent larger districts than state representatives and live farther
away from their constituents, they would tend to acquire a new "national" perspective on the issues.
See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 10, at 83. Even today, Congressmen tend to become more
sympathetic to minority groups as they spend more time in Washington. The Antifederalists in 1789
feared exactly such an altering of Congressmen's perspectives. C. KENYON, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS
xxi-cxvi (1966).
Madison also anticipated that a large republic would be more protective of minority rights than
would the states because such a republic would attract more qualified leaders to govern it. These
leaders, being virtuous, would try to act for the public good and would not as willingly oppress
minorities. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 10, at 82. While this argument is hard to prove or
disprove, it is probably true that most Americans have more confidence in the abilities of their Con-
gressmen than of their state representatives. The greater job security and prestige that attach to serv-
ing in Congress, as compared to a state legislature, probably do tend to attract more educated, if not
more virtuous, politicians. Cf Will, Reagan's Subtraction Button, NEWSWEEK, February 15, 1982 at
96. (noting that "larger tasks may attract larger people.") But see R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMO-
CRATIC THEORY 16-17 (1956) (denouncing this proposition as "dubious and probably false").
Finally, Madison believed that to the extent that large democracies must rely on rule by representa-
tion-rather than on direct popular rule-they would be more protective of minority rights. Direct
democracy, Madison believed, led to majority tyranny in the few instances in which it had been tried.
THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 10, at 77-84.
24. See M. OLSON, supra note 11, at 165-67. Feminists may believe that women have been at
such a disadvantage in the recent battles relating to abortion, which they have lost despite polls indi-
cating popular support. Taxpayers have also been at such a disadvantage relative to interest groups on
all spending bills. This situation recently caused one commentator to propose an amendment designed
precisely to limit interest group politics relating to spending. Will, Power to the President, NEWS-
WEEK, Oct. 12, 1981, at 120. That proposal advocates an item veto for the President on appropriations
matters. More than the proposed Balanced Budget Amendment, it would thereby undo some of the
coalition-forming advantages that Madisonian politics provides with regard to spending.
The possibly excessive protection Madisonian politics gives to minority interests has spurred various
other attempts at political reform as well. Thus, Congress has at times considered proposals for the
regulation and disclosure of lobbying. N. ORNSTEIN & S. ELDER, supra note 11, at 227. Not all the
minorities that benefit from interest group politics are commonly thought to deserve the benefits they
get. There are costs as well as benefits associated with Madisonian interest group politics. See supra
note 1 1.The current political system may favor constituency interest groups more than they were
favored in 1789 because of the advent of single member districts and primaries. A. CAMPBELL, P.
CONVERSE, W. MILLER, & D. STOKES, ELECTIONS AND THE POLITICAL ORDER 351-72 (1966).
25. In some ways, Madison's observation that a large republic would best protect minorities has
become even more valid today because of recent reapportionment decisions. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377
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ness and insularity that render minorities vulnerable at the state level ac-
cords them power disproportionate to their numbers in the federal
legislative process.
21
In summary, whereas state procedure and structure reinforce the ten-
dency of majorities to tyrannize minorities, federal procedure and struc-
ture weaken any such tendency. Thus, "[i]n the extent and proper struc-
ture of the Union . . .we have [beheld] a republican remedy for the
diseases most incident to republican government."27
II. Applying Madisonian Political Theory to Equal Protection Analysis
Madison's argument that the federal government will be more protec-
tive of discrete and insular minorities than will the states has important
implications for equal protection analysis. In particular, it suggests that
U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). These
decisions have increased the simple majoritarian features of the state governments by mandating the
one-man, one-vote principle. See A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 104-
81 (1970). As a result, state governments can no longer be designed to assure that all groups will have
access to the political process. The reapportioners mechanically focus instead on the notion of each
individual's equal right to vote. A. BICKEL, REFORM AND CONTINUITY 1-36 (1971).
A polity designed in accordance with simple majoritarian principles is ill-equipped to protect mi-
norities: Voting district lines may after all be drawn so as to split up the minority vote. Moreover, the
one-man, one-vote rule not only fails on its own to protect minority rights but may also impede
gerrymandering beneficial to minority interests. Thus the Court may have done minorities a disservice
by failing to recognize the negative implications for minority rights of simple majoritarian voting
schemes. Where reapportionment is not specifically intended to increase the power of a minority
group, but merely to make a state more majoritarian, it may expose minorities to the danger of always
being outvoted. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 168-69 (1970); see A.
BICKEL, POLITICS AND THE WARREN COURT 175-98 (1965). But see Note, Affirmative Action and
Electoral Reform, 90 YALE L.J. 1811 (1981) (suggesting that malapportionment to protect minorities
is less desirable than such electoral reforms as proportional representation).
26. Supporters of decentralization have at times countered this argument by maintaining that
minorities will be better protected in the absence of a national government since they would then be
able to "vote with their feet" by moving to sympathetic states. According to this theory, Madison's
national government would be potentially more threatening to minorities than the state governments
since unjust federal laws may be enforced nationwide. A repreisive national government could elimi-
nate the option minorities now have of moving to more desirable jurisdictions.
This argument ignores, however, the essence of Madison's insight. If the states are for structural
reasons inherently likely to repress minorities, then it is possible that most, if not all, the states will
have repressive laws respecting certain minority groups. If that proves true, then minorities will be
unable to move so as to avoid majority tyranny. At any given time, Madisonianism predicts that the
federal government will be more protective of minority rights than most states.
The Madisonian argument for nationalism applies only to discrete and insular minorities, however.
Large amorphous groups may actually be disadvantaged by the federal legislative process. See supra
note 24. For those groups decentralization may be desirable.
All this may suggest some possible divisions of authority between the states and the national gov-
ernment. Perhaps Congress and the federal courts should take principal responsibility for constitution-
ally protected minorities, while the states should assume greater responsibility for other matters. One
great advantage of a federal system of government is that it allows each level of government to per-
form those tasks for which it is structurally best equipped. Perhaps Madison's insights on the federal
structure in America will prove to be of global importance given the increased strength of many
separatist movements and the increased need for supra-national coalitions. See generally A. LIJPHART,
THE POLITICS OF ACCOMMODATION (2d ed. 1975) (discussing theory of consociational democracy).
27. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 10, at 84.
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different equal protection approaches may be appropriate at the state and
federal levels. At each level, doctrines are needed that reflect the relative
likelihood of invidious discrimination. In particular, a less stringent equal
protection approach is called for at the federal level.
A. Federal Equal Protection
There are at least two ways of revising federal equal protection doctrine
to take account of the Madisonian argument. A less stringent standard of
equal protection review could be applied to federal legislation. Alterna-
tively courts could examine the governmental procedures that created a
challenged classification.
1. Reduction to Middle Level Review
Federal equal protection could track the theory underlying the Supreme
Court's approach to gender classifications. In that area, a relaxed standard
of review is currently applied. 8 John Hart Ely has justified that standard
on the theory that women, because of their numbers and position in soci-
ety, are better able than minorities to exert political influence.2 9 Under
Madisonian theory, the opportunities for all minority groups to exert po-
litical influence are greater at the federal than at the state level. The justi-
fication for a relaxed scrutiny of gender classifications would thus also
support relaxed scrutiny at the federal level of all classifications involving
28. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1060-77 (1978); see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
For a general discussion of the suspect classification doctrine, see L. TRIBE, supra, at 991-1082
(providing overview of equal protection analysis and of the process by which suspect classes are identi-
fied). For a discussion of strict scrutiny specifically, see J. ELY, supra note 1, at 101-36, 148-49; L.
TRIBE, supra, at 1000-02; Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolv-
ing Doctrine on A Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972); Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Forward: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1, 22 (1977).
29. J. ELY, supra note 1, at 164-70. These factors, however, are counterbalanced by the high
organizational costs that accompany large numbers and dispersal. M. OLSON, supra note 11. Accord-
ingly, prejudice against women may not be as easily overcome as prejudice against other disadvan-
taged groups. In particular, since women are not a discrete and insular minority some of the Madis-
onian protections at the federal level are of no benefit to them. Federal process, then, may protect
women less than it protects racial minorities. See supra note 24. If so, the standard justification for a
lower level of gender review must fail.
Another justification, however, might rely on the fact that women have different characteristics as a
group from the other groups safeguarded by equal protection doctrine. See J. ELY, supra note 1, at
164-70. Women are thus not directly analogous to the minorities the Fourteenth Amendment was
intended to protect. They are not a minority that faces peculiar disadvantages at the state level. It is
interesting in this connection to note that the proposed Equal Rights Amendment would ban discrimi-
nation against women at both the state and federal level. That amendment would provide that
"Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state
on account of sex." 40 CONG. Q. 1585 (July 3, 1982).
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discrete and insular minorities. In both instances, the Carolene Products
premise of distrust is less valid? Unfortunately, standards of middle level
review give the courts relatively little guidance in individual cases. More
precise guidelines would thus be desirable.
2. Invoking Full Congressional Review: The Non-Delegation Doctrine
As an alternative to middle level review, courts might inquire directly
into the procedures that produced the classification at issue. Justice Ste-
vens suggested such an approach in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong" and in
Fullilove v. Klutznick." In Hampton, the Court struck down a Civil Ser-
vice Commission regulation that prohibited the hiring of aliens. Writing
for the majority, Justice Stevens cited the non-delegation doctrine"3 and
implied that only Congress could make decisions to discriminate.
Stevens' insistence that only Congress may make such decisions is sensi-
ble given Madison's argument about the federal legislative process. Only
in Congress could minorities hope to avoid invidious discrimination by
"logrolling". Courts using direct proceduralist inquiry might therefore
prohibit delegation in some cases on the theory that the power to discrimi-
nate must be exercised directly by a legislative body to which minorities
have real access? 4
30. Footnote 4 of United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1938), observes
that prejudice may sometimes be a special condition that blocks the operation of the political process.
Under Madisonian theory, such prejudice is less likely to operate at the federal level because of the
structure of the federal government.
31. 426 U.S. 88, 100-05 (1976).
32. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
33. In recent years the non-delegation doctrine has been used with increasing frequency by the
courts when an area of delegated discretion comes close to a fundamental value. See Hampton v. Mow
Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (denying Civil Service Commission authority to discriminate against
aliens); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (denying Secretary of State discretionary power over
passports); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) (striking down criminal contempt convic-
tion for refusing to answer questions of House Un-American Activities Committee). Alexander Bickel
explained the rationale behind the two latter decisions by arguing that the distinction between valid
and invalid delegations
must lie in the importance of the decision left to the administrator or other official. And this is
a judgement that will naturally be affected by the proximity of the area of delegated discretion
to a constitutional issue. The more fundamental the issue, the nearer it is to principle, the
more important that it be decided in the first instance by the legislature.
A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 161 (1962). See Gewirtz, The Courts, Congress, and
Executive Policy-Making: Notes on Three Doctrines, 40 LAW & CONTEMt'. PROBS. 46 (1976).
The non-delegation doctrine reached its heyday in the 1930's when broad New Deal delegations
were invalidated. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. Uriited States, 295 U.S. 495, 529-42 (1935); Panama
Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 414-30 (1935). More recently, Justice Rehnquist has suggested
reviving the non-delegation doctrine in the context of at least one modern regulatory statute. American
Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543-48 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
34. Stevens laid the groundwork for an even more ambitious proceduralist inquiry in his dissent
in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 532 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The statute at issue in
Fullilove ensured, by means of a quota based on race, that certain federal contracts would go to
minority-owned firms. Stevens attacked the statute not for its use of a racial quota, but for its proce-
dural history: although operating in the teeth of a constitutional rule discouraging racial classification,
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Under this approach to federal equal protection, courts would focus on
whether the legislative process has been circumvented through delegation,
or whether there have been other procedural flaws that would dilute mi-
nority influence. Such flaws might include, for example, the use of legisla-
tive committees or debate rules to bury issues important to minority repre-
sentatives." Madison did not anticipate the emergence of some of the
devices that modern legislators have developed to stabilize their majority
coalitions. 6 Where those devices exist and appear to burden minorities
courts may legitimately ask for full congressional review.
In asking for such review courts should respect Congress' institutional
needs. Courts should recognize that delegation and committees are often
necessary," and that stable majority coalitions have their uses. Only when
those coalitions unfairly burden minorities should the ordeal of full legis-
lative review be required.
A proceduralist approach to federal equal protection can be more
closely tailored to Madisonian theory than can a category-based reduction
to middle level review. By requiring full congressional consideration, such
a proceduralist approach could ensure that the Madisonian process was
actually at work. In doing this, the courts would protect minorities at the
the statute had been adopted with virtually no deliberation or debate. Id. at 549-50.
The procedural delays and scrutiny required by Stevens would necessitate the prolonged mainte-
nance of majority coalitions, which are already difficult to form and maintain. Requiring their pro-
longed maintenance would make this task all the more formidable. Moreover, it would give minorities
time to mobilize during which they could exploit their organizational advantage over the majority.
Again, this advantage would be greatest at the federal level because of the lower communications costs
faced by minority leaders. See supra pp. 1408-10.
Justice Stevens' requirement that Congress engage in extensive deliberations and build a record in
support of its decisions takes him beyond the federal procedural protections contemplated by Madison.
Moreover, Stevens' record building notions do not provide Congress much guidance. This Note there-
fore recommends only that the non-delegation doctrine be used with regard to suspect classifications at
the federal level. Anything more would threaten to involve the courts in the congressional decision-
making process itself. It must be recognized, however, that delegation occurs when committees or
debate rules are used to prevent a vote of Congress on issues important to minority interests. In those
cases, the delegation is to a subset of the legislature.
35. See G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 70-72 (1982)
("[C]ommittees are dearly a source of inertia and often bottle up laws and reforms that the full
legislature would pass.") See also J. SUNDQUIST, POLITICS AND POLICY: THE EISENHOWER, KEN-
NEDY, AND JOHNSON YEARS 506-37 (1968) (suggesting that committees are much less able to frustrate
will of majority of legislature now than before 1960's); Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common- Law
Orbits, 17 CATH. U.L. REV. 401, 424-25 (1968) (suggesting that for "all the vaunted responsiveness
of legislatures to the will of the people, it is no secret that legislative committees, particularly those
dominated by the elder statesmen of a seniority system, tend to dilute the reliability of statutes as
expression of public policy").
36. These devices have no doubt emerged because of the unexpected virulence of interest group
politics. Madison probably did not anticipate the extent to which majority rule would be limited by
the federal legislative process. See supra note 24.
37. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 35, at 71-72 (often majority of congressmen want a bill to be
killed in committee despite what they say in public); Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislatve
Power II, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 561, 592 (1947) ("Delegation of power to administration is the
dynamo of the modern social service state.")
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federal level while remaining faithful to the Framers' desires?8
The Madisonian system already protects discrete and insular minorities
better than is commonly realized: there have been very few federal statutes
passed in this century that invidiously discriminate on the basis of race. 9
Most such discrimination at the federal level has come from the bureau-
cracy and not from Madison's Congress. This fact has important conse-
quences for John Hart Ely's theory of equal protection and of judicial
review.
Ely asserts that the pluralist political process has characteristically
failed with regard to discrete and insular minorities.4 ' He therefore sug-
38. The recognition that the federal government is more trustworthy than the states in the area of
minority rights may also have some important policy implications that should be acknowledged. For
example, in the area of affirmative action Madisonian theory might indicate that such programs
should be run only at the federal level. Madisonians might be suspicious of state officials making any
distinction on the basis of race. There might be a presumption that federal distinctions would be less
likely to be harmful to minorities' best interests than state distinctions.
That presumption, however, would extend only to those distinctions made by Congress where
group pressures are most fully at work. There may after all be decisions we trust Congress to make,
but not adminstrative agencies or state legislatures. Thus affirmative action programs that delegate the
power to discriminate, like the one in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 532-54 (1980) (Stevens, J.
dissenting), would not be allowed to stand. The affirmative action program at issue in Fullilove dele-
gated to administrators the key decision as to who qualified as a beneficiary. Id. at 534-35.
A Madisonian equal protection analysis could also be important in alleviating the current overuse
of the equal protection doctrine. See C. BLACK, DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW (1981); G. CALABRESI,
supra note 35, at 8-15. Both authors criticize the use of equal protection analysis for problems it was
not intended to solve. They suggest that such overuse weakens the doctrine in the areas it was origi-
nally designed to cover, areas where it is needed most.
39. Analysis of federal equal protection cases pertaining to race indicates that Fullilove v. Klutz-
nick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), involved a statutory racial classification. Other federal cases involved dis-
criminatory classifications by government officials. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)
(District of Columbia officials maintained segregated public schools); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944) (military order confined persons of Japanese ancestry in concentration camps); Hira-
bayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (persons of Japanese ancestry required by military order
to obey curfew in west coast areas during early months of World War II). Even in Fullilove the key
question of determining membership in a racial group was delegated to government officials. 448 U.S.
at 532-50.
Federal statutes directed against racial minorities were adopted earlier in this century to restrict
immigration. But these laws were targeted at non-citizens who would obviously benefit less from the
Madisonian protections in a federal Congress than minority citizens who can exercise the right to
vote.
40. J. ELY, supra note 1, at 135, 152-53. Ely notes that some minorities are "barred from the
pluralist's bazaar" by racial prejudice. "'Race prejudice, in short, provides the 'majority of the whole'
with that 'common motive to invade the rights of other citizens' that Madison believed improbable in
a pluralistic society.'" Id. at 152-53. Ely also notes that:
Of course the pluralist model does work sometimes, and minorities can protect themselves by
striking deals and stressing the ties that bind the interests of other groups to their own. But
sometimes it doesn't, as the single example of how our society has treated its black minority
(even after that minority had gained every official attribute of access to the process) is more
than sufficient to prove.
Id. at 135.
Ely does not take into account, however, the argument made above that race prejudice will be costly
and unlikely at the federal level because congressional leaders will more often need minority votes. A
Madisonian would not necessarily expect, as Ely does, that prejudice will distort the federal political
process. A Madisonian might, however, expect such prejudice at the state level.
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gests that the courts must intervene if those minorities are to be pro-
tected.4 In fact, however, minorities have been protected by the federal
political process. Thus heightened judicial solicitude, under Ely's theory,
is needed primarily when dealing with the states and with bureaucrats.
Ely misstates his case when he says that it is the pluralist political pro-
cess that has failed to protect minorities. Actually it is the relative absence
of political pluralism at the state level and in the bureaucracy that has
created a need for judicial action. Distrust should emerge in the absence of
pluralist democracy and not in its presence.
Not all the groups protected by current federal equal protection doc-
trine, however, can be safeguarded through direct proceduralist inquiry.
As mentioned above, only discrete and insular minorities are protected by
the federal legislative process.42 Thus, women and other non-insular
groups may need some sort of special protection. The nature of and need
for that protection will doubtless remain a source of controversy.43
B. State Equal Protection
Along with a relaxation of equal protection review of federal legisla-
tion, Madisonian theory also counsels a more stringent review of state
legislation. Under present doctrine, the courts maintain that any racial
classification can be justified by a compelling state interest.44 Although no
state interests have yet been asserted that will survive this test, this alone
does not insulate the test from criticism. For the language used by the
courts suggests that a balancing of interests is appropriate. If a state is
likely to overestimate the weight of its interests, this balancing approach
may encourage discriminatory state actions.
41. Such intervention is to be aided by the doctrine of suspect classifications, which according to
Ely "function[s] as a handmaiden of motivation analysis." J. ELY, supra note 1, at 145. By this Ely
means that the use of a suspect classification should suggest to us the presence of that prejudice that
under Carolene Products curtails the operation of the political process. Ely's goal is to ban such
prejudice and all other unconstitutional motivations. Id. at 135-83.
Madisonian theory suggests that if we want a handmaiden for motivation analysis we should look
not only at whether a law is based on a suspect classification but also, and more importantly, at the
level of government from which that law emerged. The purpose of presumptions in equal protection
analysis (and of the suspect classification doctrine) is to avoid ad hoc, case-by-case determinations as to
when prejudice exists. Madisonian theory also accomplishes this goal, but distributes the presump-
tions according to the size of the polity, as well as the identity of the group discriminated against.
Such a distribution is appropriate since illicit prejudice is much more likely to be present in state
legislatures than in Congress. See supra p. 1408.
42. See supra p. 1409.
43. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 780-81 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Since that
issue is beyond the purview of this Note, attention has thus far been focused primarily on racial
minorities. There is a consensus that a primary purpose of equal protection doctrine is the protection
of racial groups. See also supra note 29 (discussing the appropriateness of special constitutional pro-
tection for women).
44. See L. TRIBE, supra note 28, at 991-1082.
1415
The Yale Law Journal
Madisonian theory imputes to the states just such a tendency to overes-
timate the weight of their interests at the expense of minority groups. It
might therefore be interpreted to support the abandonment of balancing
language at the state level so that even the most compelling interests
would not overcome our suspicion of the states when minority rights are
involved. According to this view, there should be an absolute prohibition
against discriminatory state laws that no governmental interest could
overcome.
Charles Black has argued that a "rhetoric of absolutes" is sometimes
needed in constitutional law even when a principle is not really absolute. 5
This may be so in areas where it is extremely unlikely that we will ever
find a competing value that will win in a balancing test. In those situa-
tions, Black would have us use absolute language to indicate our pre-
sumption that the "absolute" standard should always prevail.4' In prac-
tice, we may sometimes fail to live up to our principle, but we are more
likely to succeed if we begin by believing it to be absolute."7
This advantage of absolute standards may be needed for equal protec-
tion analysis at the state level. The presumption would be that state dis-
crimination is so often unjustified that an absolute ban is needed to keep it
to a minimum. At the federal level, however, where Madison has given us
reason to be less suspicious, the protections associated with absolutism
may be harmful unless we really want to make equality a supreme value
before which everything else must fall.
The use of absolute language would provide an effective remedy against
the recalcitrance of the states in two specific ways. First, absolute lan-
45. Black, Mr. Justice Black, the Supreme Court and the Bill of Rights, HARPER'S, February
1961, at 63. But c A. BICKEL, supra note 33, at 84-98 (suggesting that Black's enthusiasm for
absolutes is misplaced).
46. Absolute language would thus be especially useful in First Amendment cases, where we place
an especially high value on the freedoms protected. Justice Black always emphasized the absolute
nature of the First Amendment. See also G. CALARESI, supra note 35, at 178-81 (suggesting that
Justice Black did not believe as much in absolutes as in utility of rhetoric of absolutes).
47. Charles Black has illustrated the advantages of absolutes by telling a story about two fathers:
One says, "My children have an absolute right to my presence and help." The other says,
"Few personal decisions call for so much delicate balancing as the process of deciding from day
to day, just how much my children are to have of my presence and help, as against other
claims on my time and energy." The first man, if pressed, would have to admit that he could
not be with his children all the time, or help them in every imaginable way, and even that it
might not be a good thing if he could. He would admit, moreover-as a logical consequence of
this practical admission-that he must first define his rather vague terms, before he can make
out the contours of his obligation to his children, and that this definitional process can involve
some pretty delicate balancing. The second man, these admissions made, would of course have
to say, "All right, you may call your obligation 'absolute' if you like, since in defining it you go
through the same sort of balancing process as I do when I weigh my obligations to my children
against competing claims." Nothing is left at issue. But which one would you bet on for being
at home the most evenings, when the hour rolls around for the bedtime ritual?
Black, supra note 45, at 66.
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guage at the state level would affect public attitudes. Potential discrimina-
tors would be dissuaded from looking for "loopholes," and from overesti-
mating the status of their interests under law. This would guard against
the danger that discriminatory social practices might outdistance remedial
lawsuits. Second, absolute language at the state level would affect judges'
attitudes and their exercise of discretion in framing remedial orders.
Judges are less likely to permit inadequate remedies for state discrimina-
tion if the Constitution is read to forbid such discrimination in absolute
terms.
A notorious example of an inadequate remedy may be found in a num-
ber of the cases that followed Brown v. Board of Education.48 In those
cases the "all deliberate speed" formula was maintained for far longer
than most commentators considered appropriate.49 Perhaps the courts had
found, sub silentio, a "compelling state interest" in avoiding riots that
overcame the implementation of established constitutional rights.5 0 Such a
perversion of justice and of the proper role of the courts might not have
happened had an absolute equal protection standard been maintained at
the state level.
The maintenance of an absolute equal protection standard may only be
possible at one level of government at a time. Thus an absolute standard
at the state level may require a lower standard for the federal government.
This is the case because there are very few absolute principles that can be
widely applied. The more such principles we recognize, the more occa-
sions we will have where they conflict.
As we try to apply absolute principles to more and more cases, the
likelihood of such conflicts increases." It is therefore not surprising that
48. After the initial decision in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I), that
separate but equal schools were inherently unequal, the Court requested further argument before
ordering a remedy. In Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II), the Court decided
to order desegregation "with all deliberate speed." Delay in implementing desgregation followed. See,
e.g., Keyes v. School District Number One, Denver, Colorado, 396 U.S. 1215 (Brennan, Circuit
Justice, 1969); Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 396 U.S. 19 (1969); L. TRIBE,
supra note 28, at 1032-42. The delays prompted Justice Black to observe: "I fear that this long denial
of constitutional rights is due in large part to the phrase 'with all deliberate speed.' I would do away
with that phrase completely." 396 U.S. 1218, 1222 (Black, Circuit Justice, 1969).
49. For a critical discussion of the "with all deliberate speed" formula, see L. TRIBE, supra note
28, at 1032-42; Carter, The Warren Court and Desegregation, in THE WARREN COURT: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS 46-57 (R. Sayler, B. Boyer, and R. Gooding, eds. 1969); McKay, "With All Deliberate
Speed' A Study of School Desegregation, 31 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991 (1956). But c. A. BICKEL, supra
note 33, at 247-54 (suggesting that gradual desegregation was essential for political reasons and was
consistent with Court's powers to exercise discretion).
50. The Court's belief that it could take account of popular feeling, even at the cost of denying
plaintiffs their constitutional rights, suggests that it believed there was present a compelling govern-
mental interest in avoiding riots sufficient to outweigh those rights. Given this, the flaws of the equal
protection balancing test become even more apparent. That test has done harm in addition to the
sanctioning of racism in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
51. For a discussion of the problems in choosing between conflicting "absolute" values, see G.
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equal protection balancing language originated in a federal case and only
subsequently came to cover state equal protection cases as well. Prior to
that, an absolute standard had prevailed at the state level.5" Perhaps that
standard could have been more easily maintained had it not been ex-
panded to cover the federal government. 3
CALABRESI, supra note 35, at 178-81; G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBIT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978).
Note that Madison himself doubted that absolutes could be made to work in constitutional law if
they were really absolute. In a letter to Jefferson, Madison wrote:
Supposing a bill of rights to be proper the articles which ought to compose it, admit of much
discussion. I am inclined to think that absolute restrictions in cases that are doubtful, or where
emergencies may overrule them, ought to be avoided. The restrictions however strongly marked
on paper will never be regarded when opposed to the decided sense of the public, and after
repeated violations in extraordinary cases they will lose even their ordinary efficacy. Should a
Rebellion or insurrection alarm the people as well as the Government, and a suspension of the
Hab. Corp. be dictated by the alarm, no written prohibitions on earth would prevent the
measure. Should an army in time of peace be established in our neighborhood by Brit. or
Spain, declarations on paper would have as little effect in preventing a standing force for the
public safety. The best security against these evils is to remove the pretext for them.
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (October 17, 1788) reprinted in A. MASON, THE
STATES RIGHTS DEBATE, ANTIFEDERALISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 178 (1964).
If absolutes are difficult to enforce when they apply to only one level of government, as Madison
argues, they will prove all that much harder to enforce against both levels. Thus, if we wish to have
the advantage of absolutist rhetoric in equal protection analysis, we may have to content ourselves
with having that advantage only at the state level where it is most needed.
52. Balancing language first appeared in an equal protection context in Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), a case involving the federal government. Korematsu and Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), which also involved federal discrimination, are the only two cases in
which governmental use of a suspect classification has survived strict scrutiny. From the infamous
Korematsu case, non-absolute language spread to state Fourteenth Amendment equal protection cases
despite the fact that the states are less trustworthy than the federal government in equal protection
matters.
Charles Black has commented on this development by observing that
the most serious thing the 'new' equal protection has done is, ever so slowly, but visibly in case
and comment, to change discrimination against blacks from a thing seen, in the noble 1880
opinion in Strauder v. West Virginia as being categorically forbidden, to a thing only 'sus-
pected,' though with some depth, to be sure; that is what can happen when you take a term
that stands in the chain of reasoning that supported the decision in a case like Korematsu-the
Japanese Exclusion case-and try to make something good of it. The kiss of death never
sweetens. This deplorable change, as to anti-black discrimination, may not work results as
baneful as those of which it is theoretically capable. Let us pray.
C. BLACK, supra note 38, 45-46 (footnotes omitted).
53. The difficulty of maintaining absolute equal protection standards at both levels of government
has important implications for the current debate over incorporation and the Fourteenth Amendment.
Compare Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Four-
teenth Amendment fully incorporates Bill of Rights) with R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY
134-56 (1977) (suggesting that Fourteenth Amendment does not fully incorporate Bill of Rights). One
effect of full incorporation is that it encourages the inappropriate analogizing of federal to state cases.
Charles Black cites a chilling example of this in the context of the First Amendment. C. BLACK,
STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 38-39 (1969). The analogizing of Kore-
matsu to state equal protection cases provides yet another such example.
A single equal protection doctrine, however, has imposed other costs in addition to the erosion of
the once absolute state equal protection doctrine. One such cost has been the weakening of participa-
tional values at the federal level. As Alexander Bickel has argued, every time a problem is resolved by
political institutions the process of consent is strengthened. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 8
(1975). Use of the judiciary to solve problems that Congress solves well needlessly undermines demo-
cratic values.
Another cost of the current federal equal protection doctrine has been the Court's lack of success in
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In summary, the strong language of equal protection should have been
saved for discrimination at the state level where it was really needed. As
Alexander Bickel wrote, "[w]ords and concepts, such as those of Due Pro-
cess and Equal Protection, are only words and concepts to be sure, but
they create attitudes, they tend toward a mind-set, they influence future
thought and action." 4
III. Constitutional Justifications for Differentiating Between the States
and the Federal Government in Equal Protection Analysis
It has been suggested that a Madisonian equal protection doctrine is
correct as a matter of policy. It now remains to be demonstrated that such
a doctrine can be anchored in the Constitution as well. As a matter of
constitutional law, it is completely appropriate to differentiate between the
states and the federal government in equal protection analysis. This is the
case whether consideration is given to the text, to the intent of the fram-
ers, to the case law, or to arguments of structure and relation.
A. The Text
First, as Justice Stevens noted in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,"5 the
due process clause appears in both the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amend-
ments, whereas the equal protection clause does not.56 This does tend to
suggest that the primary office of the latter "differs from and is additive
to, the protection guaranteed by the former.""
Of course the concepts of equal protection and due process are interre-
lated: both reflect a concern that legislation be framed in general terms
and that individuals not be singled out for unusually heavy burdens.5 8 But
molding a consensus as to what equal protection should mean. The range of views expressed from
Rehnquist's to Michelman's is truly startling. Compare Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, at 777-86
(1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (equal protection forbids only classifications based on race and
national origin) with Michelman, On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83
HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969) (equal protection clause incorporates Mr. John Rawls' theory of justice).
54. A. BICKEL, supra note 53, at 6.
55. 426 U.S. 88, 100 n.17 (1976).
56. The Fifth Amendment provides that "No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment provides
that "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1.
57. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 n.17 (1976). But cr. Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 93 (1976) (suggesting that equal protection analysis in Fifth Amendment area is same as that
under Fourteenth Amendment); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (suggesting that concepts of
equal protection and due process both stem from American ideal of fairness).
58. The need for generality in legislation has been defended by many authors. See, e.g., J. ELY,
supra note 1, at 73-105; F. HAYEK, 1 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY (1973); Comment, The
Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 Yale L.
J. 330 (1962). Friedrich von Hayek, in particular, has defended general rules as being essential to the
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"[tihe 'equal protection of the laws' is a more explicit safeguard of prohib-
ited unfairness than 'due process of law.' ",9 Therefore, it is unlikely the
two phrases were intended to be interchangeable.
B. The Framer's Intent
In fact, as Ely observes, the notion that "the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment incorporates the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth . . . is gibberish both syntactically and historically . *."..61 The
intent of the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment was pri-
marily to limit the power of the states to act in the area of race.6 2 They
wanted to make the Constitution colorblind as far as the states were con-
cerned, and yet to leave Congress free to run programs like the Freed-
man's Bureau in the south.6' Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment was writ-
ten, not to impose substantive limits on government at all levels, but
rather to transfer certain powers from the states to the federal govern-
ment. This is not surprising given that the Civil War had been fought, in
part, over questions of the states' rights against the federal government.
In light of this congressional intent, it is easier to appreciate why the
Supreme Court has held on at least two occasions that the federal govern-
ment has special powers under section five of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.64 Those powers logically belong to the federal government and not
to the states because the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment trusted
Congress to remedy past discrimination but did not trust the states to do
so. They indicated their presumption of greater federal trustworthiness by
imposing an explicit equal protection clause only on the states. Their pre-
preservation of liberty. F. HAYEK, supra, 1-72.
59. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). This more explicit safeguard is appropriate
because of our presumption that the states are less trustworthy than the federal government with
respect to minority rights.
60. In fact, Ely notes that
Congressman Bingham appears at least initially to have thought that an equal protection con-
cept was part of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. . . . That he came during the
debates to recognize that his understanding was unusual is suggested by the fact that in re-
drafting the Fourteenth Amendment he added an Equal Protection Clause to the Due Process
Clause that had appeared in his first draft.
J. ELY, supra note 1, at 202 n.79.
61. Id. at 32. Ely does, however, locate a federal equal protection principle in the Ninth Amend-
ment. Id. at 38. Presumably the Madisonian arguments advanced above respond in part to Ely's
Ninth Amendment claim. See also Estreicher, Book Review, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 558 (1981)
(disputing Ely's discovery of federal equal protection principle in Ninth Amendment).
62. J. ELY, supra note 1, at 32-33; Karst, The Fifth Amenadnent's Guarantee of Equal Protec-
tion, 55 N.C.L. REV. 541 (1977); Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J.
227, 232-34 (1972); Comment, Federalism and a New Equal Protection, 24 VILL. L. REV. 557
(1978).
63. KEY ISSUES IN THE AFRO-AMERICAN EXPERIENCE, supra note 4, at 5-25 (discussing the
Freedman's Bureau and federal action in race relations).
64. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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sumption has been borne out, as is indicated by recent section five cases,
in which the federal government has used its power to remedy past dis-
crimination to prevent the states from oppressing blacks."
C. Case Law Origins of Federal Equal Protection
A third constitutional justification for differentiating between the states
and the federal government looks to the origin of the federal equal protec-
tion doctrine. That doctrine emerged in Bolling v. Sharpe,"' a case involv-
ing the segregated school system run by Congress in the District of Co-
lumbia. In that case, the federal government was behaving much like a
state.67
As Justice Stevens noted in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, the most
stringent federal equal protection standard has been applied in cases
where "a federal rule is applicable to only a limited territory, such as the
District of Columbia, or an insular possession ...."-68 In such situations,
the usual Madisonian protections may be easily circumvented. Congress
as a whole lacks the time to devote full attention to the everyday manage-
ment of a single city or island. Hence, delegation is especially likely, ei-
ther to administrative officials or to a subcommittee.
Once delegation occurs, the protections afforded by federal process are
weakened. This is especially true of an area such as the District of Co-
lumbia, which is not represented in Congress. 9 For years, the District
65. See supra note 64.
66. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
67. Congress's governance of the District raises different issues and problems from its governance
of the nation as a whole. G. CALABRESI, supra note 35, at 127-29, 271-74. Professor Calabresi sug-
gests that the District of Columbia Circuit's "activism" with respect to the District may have been
caused by the City's lack of home rule and by the unusual position of the House District of Columbia
Committee. "That Committee . . .was disproportionately made up of southern congressmen who
were about as far from representative of the population of the District as one could imagine." Id. at
127.
68. 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976).
69. It might be argued that residents of the District of Columbia or of a territory are what Ely
would call "a paradigmatically powerless class politically." J. ELY, supra note 1, at 83. Because they
are disenfranchised, they are only "virtually represented" in Congress. They may therefore need more
protection than other minorities at the federal level.
Nonetheless, the fate of residents of the District of Columbia is to some degree constitutionally tied
"to the fate of those possessing political power." Id. at 83. The Congressional Black Caucus, for
example, has consistently championed causes related to the District of Columbia. Thus, it is not
surprising that the discriminatory classification at issue in Boiling was made by federal administrators
and not by Congress. As noted above, Congress has passed very few discriminatory statutes. See supra
pp. 1414-15.
In any event the vulnerability of the disenfranchised residents of the District of Columbia or of the
territories is far greater than the vulnerability of other discrete and insular minorities. Thus even if
District residents needed special constitutional protection from Congress, it would not necessarily fol-
low that other minorities would need such protection as well. In fact, the record shows that District
residents at most need protection from the federal bureaucracy. Congress has on the whole treated the
District quite generously. It has provided District residents with unusually generous financial assis-
tance and it has made serious efforts to extend them political power. Congress has passed two consti-
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was in practice governed by a subcommittee dominated by southern con-
gressmen. 0 Indeed, it was their agents, and not Congress, who kept the
District's public schools segregated.7 Accordingly, the discrimination that
was at issue in Boiling could have been dealt with by use of the non-
delegation doctrine. There was no need instead to "incorporate" the Four-
teenth Amendment into the Fifth.
Several commentators have claimed that Boiling v. Sharpe is a "non-
interpretivist" opinion.12 Yet the result in that case could easily have been
reached by interpreting the constitutional text. A Madisonian equal pro-
tection doctrine would have reached that result by interpretivist means.73
tutional amendments enfranchising District residents and a home rule statute as well.
Congress has been similarly generous to the other disenfranchised or vulnerable groups with which
it deals. For example, the residents of the territories enjoy most of the benefits of citizenship while
remaining exempt from the federal income tax. Descendants of the American Indians have recently
received very generous compensation for their ancient land claims. And resident aliens have been
extended access to most welfare benefits despite occasional public resentment.
Thus, on the whole, these vulnerable groups appear to be "virtually represented" in Congress now,
although they may not have been so represented prior to the expansion of the franchise in the 1960's.
Federal equal protection, then, may safely be restricted to the use of the non-delegation doctrine.
70. See supra note 67.
71. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS
90-91 (1947).
72. John Hart Ely, for example, suggests that, at best, federal equal protection can be grounded
in the Ninth Amendment. J. ELY, supra note 1, at 32-33.
Justice Black is reported to have been concerned that the fact that the equal protection clause only
appears explicitly in the Fourteenth Amendment might suggest that Boiling was, in part, a substan-
tive due process decision. Conversation with Professor Guido Calabresi, former law clerk to Justice
Black (1982).
Black voted for the outcome in Boiling despite his well-known dislike of substantive due process.
See In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 378-82 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 510 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). Black's vote for the outcome in that case resulted from
his belief that desegregation could only be accomplished if similar rules appeared to apply to the
federal government and the states, a reason that could not have eased his concern.
73. See supra pp. 1413-15. One significant criticism that has been directed at Ely and other
process-based theorists has been that those theorists cannot anchor their visions of the ideal political
process in the Constitution. As Michael Perry has observed:
Ely fails to justify the imposition of his implied-from-the-Constitution conception of democracy
against the will of the branches that are constituted according to an expressed-in-the-Constitu-
tion conception of democracy. . . . I cannot see how to avoid concluding that Ely has failed to
defend, against the claims of interpretivism, what he set out to defend.
Perry, Interpretivism, Freedom of Expression, and Equal Protection, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 316-17
(1981).
The Madisonian process-based theory set forth in this Note is less vulnerable to such attack. First,
it comports with the constitutional text, the intent of the Framers, and the structure and relation of
various constitutional clauses. And second, it represents the political theory of the man who largely
designed the Constitution. Thus a Madisonian process-based theory must necessarily be an interpre-
tivist theory as well. This is especially true since Madison's Federalist Papers were widely read by
those who ratified the Constitution. As Ely points out, interpretivists should be as concerned with the
intent of those who ratified the Constitution as with the intent of the Framers. J. ELY, supra note 1,
at 17-18.
That there can be an interpretivist theory of the political process is a point that has been acknowl-
edged by Judge Robert Bork. Bork notes, for example, that "[fQreedom for political speech could and
should be inferred even if there were no first amendment." Bork, supra note 1, at 23. He observes,
moreover, that "[s]peech advocating violent overthrow is . . . not 'political speech' as that term must
be defined by a Madisonian system of government. It is not political speech because it violates consti-
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Current doctrine was unable to accomplish this. Interpretivists ought
therefore to prefer Madisonian equal protection to the more intervention-
ist doctrine of Bolling v. Sharpe.
D. An Argument of Structure and Relation
Another constitutional justification for differentiating between the states
and the federal government in equal protection analysis relies on an argu-
ment of structure and relation.7 4 In particular, it relies on analogies to
various other constitutional provisions that support the legitimacy of a
Madisonian equal protection doctrine.
1. Analogy to the Contract Clause
One such provision is the contract clause."5 That clause explicitly holds
the states to a more stringent standard than the federal government.
Whereas the states are forbidden from passing any laws impairing the
obligation of contracts, the federal government is not so encumbered. 6
Interestingly, the contract clause, like the equal protection clause, origi-
nally served to protect a minority from majoritarian politics at the state
level. But while the equal protection clause was intended mainly to pro-
tect racial minorities, the contract clause was intended to protect business-
men and merchants. Both clauses presumably were written to apply only
to the states because of some recognition that it is at the state level that
majoritarian politics can be most threatening. 77 Both clauses then support
the Madisonian proposition that minorities need constitutional protection
primarily at the state level.
2. Alternative Arguments of Structure and Relation
A different argument of structure and relation would suggest that the
federal government should be estopped from violating the equal protection
tutional truths about processes. . . ." Id. at 31.
74. See C. BLACK, STRUTMURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).
75. The contract clause provides that "No State shall .. .pass any ...Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts. . . ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cd. 4. Prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the contract clause was "perhaps the strongest single constitutional check on state legisla-
tion . . . ." Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 241 (1978) (Stewart, J.).
The equal protection and contract clauses are the only constitutional provisions that hold the states
to a standard not imposed on the federal government. The guarantee clause and the privileges and
immunities clause both impose duties on the states that are already implicitly imposed against the
federal government.
76. The Framers, in addition to forbidding the states from passing laws impairing the obligation
of contracts, specifically authorized the federal government to pass some such laws. The Constitution
empowers Congress "[t]o establish. . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the
United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 4.
77. See supra note 4 & pp. 1420-21.
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clause by its decision to exact from the states a promise not to do the
same."' Presumably, this argument would extend to the contract clause,
which should then be fully operational against the federal government.
There are at least two problems with this argument from the point of
view of structure and relation. First, it suggests that the Constitution can
never impose a limit on the states without also limiting the federal govern-
ment. Yet the states are forbidden to do several things that ought to be
permitted at the national level."9 Second, it suggests that the Fifteenth
Amendment contains a redundancy. 0 For unlike the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the Fifteenth Amendment guarantees the right to vote from federal
as well as state abridgement."s
The Madisonian argument of structure and relation, in contrast, avoids
these pitfalls. It allows state power to be limited without limiting the fed-
eral government; in fact, it holds that this is particularly appropriate in
the area of minority rights where the states are suspect. In that area, as in
the area of waging war, it finds the states to be less competent than the
federal government.
The Madisonian explanation for the Fifteenth Amendment follows log-
ically from concerns of process. In other words, the federal legislative pro-
cess will best protect minorities if they are guaranteed the vote. Thus
78. Charles Black and Kenneth Karst suggest that "national citizenship implies some substantial
measure of equality among the nation's citizens." C. BLACK, supra note 74, at 51-61; Karst, supra
note 62, at 549. Karst then concludes that this must be the same measure of equality that the states
are required to maintain among their own residents by the equal protection clause. Karst also ac-
knowledges two exceptions where "'overriding national interests' might justify federal legislation even
though a similar state law would fail the test of the fourteenth amendment." Karst, supra note 62, at
558. These exceptions involve situations where federalism concerns or separation of powers concerns
are paramount. Id. at 558-62.
Karst is undoubtedly correct in asserting that national citizenship implies a certain measure of
equality among citizens. He is less dear, however, in explaining why it should be the same measure of
equality imposed on the states by the equal protection clause. As has been argued above, minorities
face different problems at the state and national levels. Different presumptions regarding the likeli-
hood of prejudice accordingly seem appropriate.
To make his argument, Karst seems to assume that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment extended an implicit notion of equal national citizenship to the states. Id. at 552. Thus he
argues that the content of the equal protection clause helps to define the principle of equal national
citizenship. This, however, ignores the privileges and immunities clause. In fact, it was that clause
and not the equal protection clause that declared us all to have the rights of citizens of the United
States.
Karst's theory, moreover, does not explain why the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were
both written to apply to the federal government, while the Fourteenth Amendment was not. A possi-
ble explanation is set forth below.
79. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
80. The Fifteenth Amendment provides that "[tihe right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude." U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1. Under this theory the Thirteenth
Amendment would presumably be redundant as well, since it forbids the federal government as well
as the states from allowing slavery. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
81. Ely makes this point forcefully in his discussion of federal equal protection. J. ELY, supra
note 1, at 32-33.
1424
Equal Protection
Madison would find no anomaly in the Reconstruction Congress' decision
to extend the Fifteenth Amendment to the federal government. That deci-
sion makes as much sense as the decision not so to extend the Fourteenth.
3. The Takings Clause and the Ban on Federal Bills of Attainder
It might be suggested that the restraints imposed on the federal govern-
ment by the takings clause82 or the bill of attainder clause83 evidence a
distrust of Congress comparable to Madison's distrust of the states. This
argument, however, misunderstands the role of those clauses in our consti-
tutional scheme. The takings clause and the bill of attainder clause are
tailored specially to bar legislative abuse that otherwise might occur even
despite federal procedural protections.
Such abuse is likely when legislation singles out individuals or very
small groups not represented in the legislature.84 Individuals and small
groups do not have the organizational advantage over the majority that
safeguards most minorities at the federal level.8" Moreover, individuals are
less likely than multi-member minorities to have sympathizers in Con-
gress. They are therefore less able to capitalize on the instability of na-
tional legislative coalitions.
It is these individuals and very small groups that the takings clause and
the bill of attainder prohibition typically safeguard. Those clauses provide
the same protection for individuals at both levels of government that is
provided for groups at the state level by the provisions on equal protection
and obligation of contracts. At the federal level, however, groups were
originally not thought to need constitutional safeguards for the reasons
implied by Madisonian theory.86
82. The takings clause provides that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without
just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The just compensation language was held to operate
against the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Chicago, Burling-
ton & Quincy Ry. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-41 (1897).
83. "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed [by Congress]." U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 9, cl. 3. Also, "No State shall. . . pass any Bill of Attainder, [or] ex post facto law ... " U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 4.
84. See Comment, The Bounds of Legislative Speci6cation: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of
Attainder Clause, 72 YALE L.J. 330, 351 (1962) (suggesting that legislatures are unsuited to task of
finding specific facts in individual situations).
85. See supra pp. 1408-10.
86. Madison himself so distrusted the states that he thought the bill of attainder clause was
needed more at the state than at the federal level. As he explained:
I wish also, in revising the constitution, we may throw into that section, which interdicts the
abuse of certain powers in the State Legislatures, some other Orovisions of equal, if not greater
importance than those already made. The words, 'No State shall pass any bill of attainder, ex
post facto law,' &c. were wise and proper restrictions in the constitution. I think there is more
danger of those powers being abused by the State Goverments than by the Government of the
United States.
James Madison, Speech Placing the Proposed Bill-of-Rights Amendments before the House of Repre-
sentatives, (June 8, 1789), reprinted in A. MASON, supra note 51, at 187.
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The existence of these clauses, then, suggests only that federal procedu-
ral protections do not guard against abuse in all circumstances. It provides
no support for the proposition that those protections are not more power-
ful than any provided by the state legislative process."
IV. Evidence that the Supreme Court is Differentiating Between the
States and the Federal Government in Equal Protection Analysis
One remaining question is whether, given the normative and constitu-
tional arguments so far considered, any evidence exists to suggest that the
Supreme Court might differentiate between the states and the federal gov-
ernment in equal protection analysis. The Court has never held explicitly
that different standards are applicable. But there are indications that it
has taken into account some of the concerns discussed above.
One such indication may be found in the Supreme Court's decision in
Fullilove v. Klutznick.ss There the Court upheld Congress' power to set
affirmative action quotas based on race under section five of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Previously, the Court had denied similar authority to
an instrumentality of the state of California in Regents of the University
of California v. Bakke." The discrepancy between these two decisions
might be explained by arguing that the Court implicitly recognized that
there must be stricter equal protection review of state actions than of fed-
eral ones. Indeed, the Court noted in Bakke that it has "previously recog-
nized the special competence of Congress to make findings with respect to
the effects of identified past discrimination and its discretionary authority
to take appropriate remedial measures.""0
This does not mean, though, that Madison believed a bill of attainder clause was unnecessary at the
federal level. As demonstrated above, his theory does suggest that the factors that protect minority
groups at the federal level do not adequately protect individuals. Special constitutional safeguards are
therefore needed.
87. In addition to the takings clause and the bill of attainder prohibition, at least four other
constitutional clauses also limit Congress' power to single out individuals for unusual or non-uniform
treatment. Thus, the Third Amendment forbids singling out individual citizens to bear the public
burden of housing soldiers. That burden can be imposed in time of war only in a manner to be
prescribed by law. U.S. CONST. amend. III. Similarly, Congress is empowered to pass only uniform
bankruptcy laws. It thus may not single out individual creditors or debtors for special treatment. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
John Hart Ely has noted that the Eighth Amendment forbids singling out individual lawbreakers
for unusual punishments. He notes as well that the ban on ex post fact6 laws makes it generally
harder to burden any individual or small group: Retrospective legislation can more easily single out
targeted individuals. J. ELY, supra note 1, at 73-105. The existence of so many clauses that ensure the
generality of legislation indicates the importance of that principle in American constitutional law.
88. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
89. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). See also G. CALABRSI, supra note 35, at 2.
90. Id. at 302 n.41 (1978) (emphasis added). The Court pointedly noted that it was not presented
in Bakke "with an occasion to review legislation by Congress pursuant to its powers under § 2 of the
Thirteenth Amendment and § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to remedy the effects of prior discrimi-
nation." Id.
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Another area of equal protection analysis where the Court has clearly
differentiated between federal and state actions is alienage. 1 There the
Court has in several instances applied a lower equal protection standard
to the federal government than to the states. Thus, in Mathews v. Diaz,9 2
the Court upheld a federal medicare program conditioning aliens' eligibil-
ity on five years residence in the United States. Similarly, in Hampton v.
Mow Sun Wong, the Court announced that the federal government would
be held to a lower standard than the states in equal protection decisions
pertaining to alienage.93 It thus declined to extend its alienage decision in
Sugarman v. DougaIP4 to the federal government. In Hampton, Justice
Stevens went so far as to observe that
The concept of equal justice under law is served by the Fifth
Amendment's guarantee of due process, as well as by the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although both
Amendments require the same type of analysis . . ., the two protec-
tions are not always coextensive. Not only does the language of the
two Amendments differ, but more importantly, there may be over-
riding national interests which justify selective federal legislation that
would be unacceptable for an individual State. On the other hand,
when a federal rule is applicable to only a limited territory, such as
the District of Columbia, or an insular possession, and when there is
no special national interest involved, the Due Process Clause has
been construed as having the same significance as the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.95
Yet another area of equal protection law where the federal government
is held to a less stringent standard than the states involves classifications
pertaining to Indians. Despite the fact that few groups in American soci-
ety are more discrete and insular than the American Indian, a whole title
of the United States Code is filled with classifications treating Indians dif-
ferently from other Americans.96 Most of these classifications were origi-
It is interesting to note in this connection that the Court first enunciated its higher constitutional
intent standard in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), a federal case. That standard has since
been applied somewhat more leniently in Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272 (1982), a case decided
under the Fourteenth Amendment. This result is entirely consistent with Madisonian theory. Courts
should more readily infer discriminatory intent where state officials are involved.
91. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 897 (1980); Note, The Equal Treatment of Aliens:
Preemption or Equal Protection? 31 STAN. L. REV. 1069 (1979); Note, State Burdens on Resident
Aliens: A New Preemption Analysis, 89 YALE L.J. 940 (1980).
92. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
93. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
94. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
95. 426 U.S. at 100. See also Comment, The Emerging Constitutional Jurisprudence of Justice
Stevens, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 155, 206-32 (1978) (explaining Justice Stevens' views on Fifth Amend-
ment equal protection).
96. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552 (1974). The Court noted in Morton that "[l]iterally
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nally enacted to "protect" Indians from their new white neighbors. They
have been upheld by the courts in part because Indian relations originally
involved foreign policy questions.
Another factor influencing the courts, however, may have been the fact
that many of these statutes were enacted only after going through the
ordeal of full congressional review. Indeed, since the extension of the
franchise, Congress has been quite generous in its treatment of Indians. 7
The courts may therefore be less suspicious of recent federal classifications
in this area.""
At the state level, however, different presumptions prevail. The states
are strictly limited in their ability to legislate on Indian affairs both be-
cause of federal preemption and because of the equal protection clause."'
Indeed, the Court has even upheld a congressional decision to deny the
state courts jurisdiction over many cases involving ordinary crimes com-
mited by Indians."0' Those cases are tried instead in the presumably more
friendly federal forum. 10
There is at least one area of equal protection law, however, where no
differentiation is made between federal and state classifications. That area
involves classifications based on gender.1 1 2 The Court's failure to differen-
tiate with regard to gender discrimination is completely explainable in
terms of Madisonian theory. Because women are not a discrete and insii-
lar minority, they obtain no special political advantage at the federal level.
every piece of legislation dealing with Indian tribes and reservations ... single[s] out for special
treatment a constituency of tribal Indians living on or near reservations. If these laws ...were
deemed invidious racial discrimination, an entire Title of the United States Code (25 U.S.C.) would
be effectively erased . . . ." Id.
97. See supra note 69.
98. It is possible that classifications that predate this expansion of the suffrage merit different
treatment. Some scholars might argue that a decision by the current Congress should be necessary to
keep statutes of this sort in effect. See G. CALABREsI, supra note 35.
99. Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 204-05 (1975); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551
(1974); McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); see L. TRIBE, supra note 28, at
1016-19. The differential equal protection standard applied to Indians exists for many of the same
reasons as the differential standard applied to aliens. See supra note 91.
100. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977).
101. Special jurisdictional provisions of this sort are especially intriguing in light of the current
controversy over the § 1983 jurisdiction of the federal courts. Section 1983 was originally passed to
ensure that blacks would have access to federal courts to redress violations of their constitutional
rights. In defining the relative jurisdiction of the state and federal courts, Congress has thus demon-
strated a preference for giving constitutionally recognized minorities easier access to the federal court
system. This makes sense given the greater sympathy federal institutions have for minority rights.
Indeed, Article III itself confers federal jurisdiction in a class of cases where one party is in danger
of being tried by a "foreign" judicial system. Thus, for example, representatives of one state may not
be tried in another state's courts. "Foreign" courts might be unsympathetic because the affected party
would not have access to the political institutions that created the court system. Similarly Congress
may simply have been concerned that blacks and Indians have reduced access to the state political
institutions that create the state courts. -If so, this concern may provide a limiting principle for § 1983.
Federal jurisdiction should ensue only where the rights of minority groups are at issue.
102. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682-84 (1973).
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It is thus logical that the Court has not distinguished between federal and
state gender-based classifications. Women have different problems from
those of other groups safeguarded by the equal protection clause.103
Despite strong inferential support,104 one cannot explain the bulk of
equal protection jurisprudence by arguing that the Supreme Court differ-
entiates sub silentio between the states and federal government. Neverthe-
less, because some cases can be thus explained, it is not extravagant to say
that there exists a basis in' the case law on which a "Madisonian" equal
protection doctrine could be built."'
Conclusion
James Madison's theory that a large federal republic would treat mi-
norities better than the states has been argued to be essentially correct.
This is the case for at least two reasons: first, the great variety of interests
in a large republic makes it hard to form permanent majority coalitions,
and second, majorities in such a republic face comparatively high organi-
zational costs.
On the basis of these structural arguments, Madisonian theory counsels
different equal protection standards for the review of federal and of state
legislation. At the federal level, Madisonian theory would support a pro-
cedural equal protection standard that would make vigorous use of the
non-delegation doctrine. At the state level, however, a more stringent, ab-
solutist approach would be appropriate.
103. See supra note 24.
104. A final area of equal protection analysis where it has been argued that the Court has shown
more deference to the federal government than to the states involves classifications based on illegiti-
macy. For a discussion, see Comment, Federalism and A New Equal Protection, 24 VILL. L. REV.
557 (1978).
105. Another indication that the Supreme Court is differentiating between the federal and state
governments in equal protection analysis may be found in the simple fact that the Court strikes down
proportionally more state laws. than federal statutes. This might suggest either that there are fewer
violations in fact at the federal level than at the state level, or that a lower standard of review is
actually being applied, or even that some combination of both these factors is present. In any event,
the outcome is consistent with the Madisonian model.
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